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September 23, 2014

VIA E-FILING AND U.S. MAIL

The Honorable Jeanne M. Cochran
Administrative Law Judge
Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings
600 North Robert Street
P.O. Box 64620
St. Paul, MN 55164

Re: In the Matter of the Application of Northern States Power Company for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in the State of Minnesota
Docket No. E-002/GR-13-868
OAH Docket No. 68-2500-31182

Dear Judge Cochran:

On behalf of the Xcel Large Industrials, attached for filing in the above docket you will find the Post-Hearing Brief.

Very truly yours,

Stoel Rives LLP

/s/ Sarah Johnson Phillips

Sarah Johnson Phillips

SJP/srb
Enclosure
cc: Service List

BEFORE THE MINNESOTA OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
100 Washington Square, Suite 1700
Minneapolis, MN 55401-2138

FOR THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA
121 Seventh Plaza East, Suite 350
St. Paul, MN 55101-2147

In the Matter of the Application of Northern States Power Company for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in the State of Minnesota	PUC Docket No. E-002/GR-13-868 OAH Docket No. 68-2500-31182

POST-HEARING BRIEF OF THE XCEL LARGE INDUSTRIALS

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Over the recent series of rate cases, industrial rates charged by Northern States Power Company d/b/a Xcel Energy ("NSP") have grown increasingly uncompetitive, which will be further aggravated by the 2014 and 2015 increases.[1] Absent a concerted effort to address NSP's uncompetitive rates, commercial and industrial ("C&I") customers may continue to leave NSP's system. A decline in sales to these customers will exacerbate future rate increases for all NSP customers.[2] To make industrial rates more competitive and just and reasonable, XLI recommends that the Administrative Law Judge (1) conduct an in-depth analysis of NSP's proposed revenue requirements to ensure that the authorized rates are fair and reasonable; (2) address fuel and purchased energy costs by requiring NSP to file an incentive-based fuel clause rider reform proposal; (3) set C&I Demand rates at cost using a Class Cost of Service Study ("CCOSS") that better reflects cost-causation; (4) establish interruptible rates that better reflect the value of capacity that interruptible customers provide to the system; (5) revise the definition of "on -peak" to include summer months; and (6) order NSP to establish a renewable energy purchase option tailored for industrial customers.[3] Flint Hills Resources, LP; Gerdau Ameristeel US Inc.; Unimin Corporation; and USG Interiors, Inc. (collectively, the "Xcel Large Industrials" or "XLI") submit the following brief in support of these suggestions.

I. INTRODUCTION

Under Minnesota law, NSP bears the burden of demonstrating that its proposed rate increase is just and reasonable. Any doubt as to the reasonableness of its proposal should be resolved in favor of the ratepayer. Here, NSP's petition to increase electric rates fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence the following: (i) that nuclear depreciation rates are reasonable in light of the substantial depreciation reserve surplus; (ii) that all costs associated with the Monticello Life Cycle Management/Extended Power Uprate (LCM/EPU) project ("Monticello Project") are used and useful; (iii) that there are valid reasons to further delay reforming the fuel clause rider; (iv) that the proposed CCOSS is reasonable without XLI's proposed modifications; and (v) that NSP's proposed rates are just and reasonable absent adopting revenue allocation and rate design strategies to mitigate increasingly uncompetitive industrial rates. The general question is whether these failures warrant adjustment of NSP's

[1] Pollock Direct at 39:9-10.
[2] Pollock Direct at 41:1-3.
[3] Pollock Direct at 41:6-13.

proposed rate increase and allocation of that increase among customer classes. Should the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") determine NSP failed to meet its burden, the ALJ will need to make corresponding adjustments to NSP's petition.

II. ANALYSIS

A. NSP Bears the Burden of Proof to Demonstrate that its Proposal is Just and Reasonable

It is NSP's burden to demonstrate its proposal is reasonable.[4] "Every rate made, demanded, or received by any public utility … shall be just and reasonable…. Any doubt as to reasonableness should be resolved in favor of the consumer."[5] The Supreme Court described the Commission's role in determining just and reasonable rates in a rate proceeding by stating:

> [I]n the exercise of the statutorily imposed duty to determine whether the inclusion of the item generating the claimed cost is appropriate, or whether the ratepayers or the shareholders should sustain the burden generated by the claimed cost, the MPUC acts in both a quasi-judicial and a partially legislative capacity. To state it differently, in evaluating the ... case the accent is more on the inferences and conclusions to be drawn from the basic facts (i.e., amount of claimed costs) rather than on the reliability of the facts themselves. Thus, by merely showing that it has incurred, or may hypothetically incur, expenses, the utility does not necessarily meet its burden of demonstrating that it is just and reasonable that the ratepayers bear the costs of those expenses.[6]

In NSP's 2012 rate case, the Commission explained the differences in its roles by acknowledging that on purely factual matters it acts in its quasi-judicial capacity and weighs evidence in the same manner as a district court, requiring facts to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. On issues involving policy judgments, the Commission acts in its quasi-legislative capacity, balancing competing interests and policy goals to arrive at the resolution most consistent with the broad public interest.[7] The fact that the Commission reviews matters in both quasi-judicial and

[4] MINN. STAT. § 216B.16, subd. 4 ("The burden of proof to show that the rate change is just and reasonable shall be upon the public utility seeking the change.").
[5] MINN. STAT. § 216B.03.
[6] *In re N. States Power Co.*, 416 N.W.2d 719, 722-23 (Minn. 1987).
[7] *In the Matter of the Application of Northern States Power Company for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in the State of Minnesota*, Docket No. E-002/GR-12-961, Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Order, at 5 (Sept. 3, 2013).

quasi-legislative capacities does not change the utility's burden in proving its case. In NSP's 2012 rate case, the Commission went on to state that

> [u]tilities seeking rate changes must therefore prove not only that the facts they present are accurate, but that the costs they seek to recover are rate-recoverable, that the rate recovery mechanisms they propose are permissible, and that the rate design they advocate is equitable under the "just and reasonable" standard set by statute.[8]

That the proposed rates meet this "just and reasonable" standard is a burden imposed on the utility, which it must establish by a preponderance of the evidence.[9] This standard is defined as "whether the evidence submitted, even if true, justifies the conclusion sought by the petitioning utility when considered together with the Commission's statutory responsibility to enforce the state's public policy that retail consumers of utility services shall be furnished such services at reasonable rates."[10]

In light of the above standards, the analysis below provides support for XLI's arguments, summarized as follows:

- The Commission is well within its authority to balance the parties' competing interests and policy goals to amortize the substantial nuclear depreciation reserve surplus consistent with the public interest;
- NSP failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that allowing costs associated with the EPU portion of the Monticello Project results in just and reasonable rates;
- Consistent with the public interest, and to appropriately place the burden of proof on NSP for showing that costs associated with fuel and purchased energy are just and reasonable, the Commission should order NSP to revise its method for fuel and purchased energy cost recovery;
- The Commission should accept NSP's CCOSS with XLI's proposed modification because it is the most reasonable proposal offered by the parties in this case;
- The Commission should exercise its discretion to set rates based on cost of service; and

[8] *Id*.
[9] *N. States Power Co.*, 416 N.W.2d at 722.
[10] *Id*.

- The Commission should order NSP to implement XLI's rate design proposals to mitigate the impacts of NSP's increasingly uncompetitive industrial rates in order to ensure that rates are just and reasonable.

B. NSP's Industrial Rates Are Not Competitive

NSP's large industrial rates are the most expensive in Minnesota, among the most expensive integrated electric utilities in surrounding states, and in the top third of the most expensive integrated electric utilities in the continental United States.[11] In his direct testimony, XLI witness Jeffry Pollock supported these conclusions with an analysis comparing the typical bills of NSP Minnesota industrial customers to corresponding bills of customers served by other electric utilities.[12] The consequence of NSP's uncompetitive industrial rates is a continued loss of sales from existing customers and inability to attract new industrial customers. Evidence of this can be seen by reviewing C&I Demand sales, which have declined far more than sales to other retail customer classes.[13] Mr. Pollock set out a comparison of historical and projected weather-normalized sales (in GWh) in his direct testimony, which is summarized in the table below:

Historical and Projected Weather-Normalized Sales (GWh)

Period	Residential	SC&I	LC&I	Other	Total Retail
2008	8,744	13,742	9,449	224	32,159
2009	8,719	13,556	8,551	227	31,053
2010	8,692	13,304	9,054	226	31,276
2011	8,736	13,273	9,064	226	31,299
2012	8,732	13,327	8,637	222	30,919
2013 Act+Fcst	8,658	13,285	8,249	220	30,413
2014 Fcst	8,514	13,172	8,333	225	30,244
2015 Fcst	8,424	13,142	8,318	225	30,109
Avg. Annual Growth Rate	-0.5%	-0.6%	-1.8%	0.1%	-0.9%

Source: Exhibit__(JEM-1), Appendix A.

[11] Pollock Direct at 40:1-6.
[12] Pollock Direct at 39:13-15; Pollock Direct Schedules 6 & 7.
[13] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 40:11-12.

No party in this case disputed Mr. Pollock's contention that NSP industrial rates are uncompetitive.[14] NSP, in fact, acknowledged competitive rates as one of its priorities. In NSP's direct testimony, President and CEO David Sparby asserted competitiveness as one of NSP's core values when he described NSP as providing "safe, reliable, and clean energy at a competitive price."[15] In his rebuttal testimony Mr. Sparby asserted that the NSP's cost allocation proposals in this case are designed to improve the competitiveness of NSP's C&I rates.[16] Mr. Sparby also specifically agreed during cross-examination that the competitiveness of industrial rates is an important concern for NSP.[17] Despite this testimony, NSP is proposing a significant rate increase in this case, which will further hinder the competitiveness of NSP's large industrial customers. At the same time, NSP continues to boast about its present economic position to investors. For example, NSP reported to investors in August that it is well-positioned for the future due to consistent dividend and earnings per share growth supported by "attractive" rate base growth.[18]

As will be more specifically addressed in the discussion below, XLI is proposing several ways to address the competitiveness of industrial rates, including a critical look at NSP's revenue requirement, the method by which it recovers fuel and purchased energy costs, more equitable revenue allocation (i.e., moving C&I Demand rates to cost), and rate design strategies.[19]

C. NSP Failed to Meet Its Burden with Respect to Certain Revenue Requirement Issues

1. The ALJ Should Recommend that NSP Amortize the Substantial Nuclear Depreciation Reserve Surplus Over a Five-Year Period

How to address a surplus depreciation reserve has been an issue in NSP's recent rate cases. In the last case, the Commission found that, regarding NSP's transmission, distribution, and general plant, there was no dispute among the parties that NSP had accrued a depreciation surplus or that the surplus should be amortized.[20] In particular, the Commission found that NSP had accumulated a $265 million depreciation surplus in its transmission, distribution, and general

[14] *See, e.g.*, Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. 1, 35:11-16.
[15] Sparby Direct at 5:18.
[16] Sparby Rebuttal at 9:6-8.
[17] Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. 1, 36:2-4.
[18] Ex. 114, Xcel Energy Presentation, "Well Positioned for the Future," slides 16, 17, 18, 25 (Aug. 4-5, 2014).
[19] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 41.
[20] *In the Matter of the Application of Northern States Power Company for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in the State of Minnesota*, Docket No. E-002/GR-12-961, Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Order, at 28.

plant accounts and ordered that this surplus be amortized over eight years.[21] In this case, NSP is proposing to amortize a $228 million (Minnesota retail) depreciation surplus over three years in order to moderate the 2014 and 2015 revenue requirement.[22] XLI appreciates NSP's willingness to consider and propose this alternative, and urges the ALJ to accept NSP's proposal.

For production plant accounts, the Commission was not ready as of the last case to conclude that the NSP had a surplus depreciation reserve in the last case. To further develop the record, the Commission directed the parties to more fully explore in the next rate case (i.e., the pending case) this issue and whether that surplus should be amortized.[23] The Commission's direction and prior decision indicates that amortization of a surplus is an appropriate strategy to mitigate rate increases.

In response to the Commission's order, NSP filed testimony in this case on the existence of a depreciation surplus for production plant. NSP's analysis indicates that as of December 12, 2012, there was a surplus nuclear depreciation reserve of $97.5 million, or $72.5 million for the Minnesota retail jurisdiction.[24] Mr. Pollock reviewed this analysis on behalf of XLI and determined that NSP understated the magnitude of the surplus by a substantial amount.[25] Mr. Pollock concluded that NSP has accumulated a $208 million (Minnesota retail) surplus in its nuclear depreciation reserve using plant balances as of December 31, 2013.[26]

None of the parties addressing this issue in testimony provided analysis disputing the existence of a surplus – again, NSP's own analysis demonstrates a surplus.[27] The real issue in dispute in this case is the size of the surplus and the appropriate way to use it. As Mr. Pollock explained in his direct testimony, a "depreciation surplus occurs when the book (or accumulated depreciation) reserve exceeds the theoretical reserve. The theoretical reserve is the amount of accumulated depreciation that NSP should have booked given the current asset life and net removal cost assumptions employed in NSP's depreciation study."[28] The existence of the surplus is the logical result of the lives of the Monticello and Prairie Island plants being

[21] *Id.* at 29.
[22] Ex. 95, Robinson Direct at 30-31; Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 9:19-10:1.
[23] *In the Matter of the Application of Northern States Power Company for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in the State of Minnesota*, Docket No. E-002/GR-12-961, Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Order, at 29.
[24] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 10:18-20; Ex. 92, Perkett Direct at 46.
[25] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 11.
[26] Ex. 264, Opening Statement of Jeffry Pollock.
[27] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 11:13-20.
[28] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 12:2-5.

extended. [29] That there is the potential for future nuclear investment is not an appropriate consideration in setting depreciation rates because depreciation relates to recovery of already-invested capital.[30] According to the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners:

> [T]he purpose of depreciation is not to build a reserve for the future…the sole purpose of depreciation accounting is to rateably allocate the capital costs of the property over its average service life through current charges to utility expenses.[31]

Or as Mr. Pollock explained in his surrebuttal testimony, "[a] surplus depreciation reserve is not a 'slush fund' to absorb future capital additions. Consistent with accepted practice and precedent, the ratemaking treatment of capital additions should be addressed in future rate cases, not in setting current depreciation rates."[32]

NSP criticized XLI's nuclear depreciation reserve surplus calculation by arguing that NSP's nuclear plants have finite lifespans.[33] Even though NSP's nuclear licenses have fixed lengths, the life spans of the nuclear plants are not necessarily fixed. NSP has previously successfully extended the lives of both the Monticello and Prairie Island plants.[34] Further life extensions likely would have the effect of increasing the present surplus.[35] And future extensions seem plausible given impending federal greenhouse gas regulations.[36]

The $208 million nuclear depreciation surplus can be used to mitigate NSP's proposed 2014-2015 revenue requirement by $25.7 million (a benefit to all ratepayers), assuming the surplus is amortized over five years. XLI recommends using the surplus to mitigate rates in 2014-2015 because it is better for ratepayers on a net present value basis,[37] is accepted practice supported by the Commission's order in the last case, and is consistent with NSP's proposed three-year amortization of the transmission, distribution, and general plant surplus in this case.

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[29] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 11:13-20.
[30] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 12:11-20.
[31] National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, *Public Utility Depreciation Practices*, at 1, 187 (Aug. 1996).
[32] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 5:8-11. See also Pollock Surrebuttal Schedule 19 for a partial list of cases in which regulators rejected including capital additions in setting depreciation rates.
[33] Ex. 94, Perkett Rebuttal at 11.
[34] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 18:1-5.
[35] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 18:6-11.
[36] Ex. 94, Perkett Rebuttal at 14:15-19.
[37] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 13:14-14:11.

2. The ALJ Should Find that Monticello Is Not "Used and Useful"

NSP proposes to include the full cost of the uprate portion of the Monticello Life Cycle Management/Extended Power Uprate ("Monticello LCM/EPU" or "Monticello Project") project in its 2014 revenue requirement. The Monticello Project collectively represents about $74.9 million of NSP's Minnesota retail test year revenue requirements.[38] For the reasons explained below, the ALJ should recommend excluding the Monticello EPU costs from rates until NSP (i) receives final approval from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") to operate at full uprate levels and (ii) actually begins operating at full uprate levels on an on-going, sustainable basis.

In the last case, the Commission found that the EPU portion of the project was not yet used and useful because it was still operating at pre-uprate levels. In particular, the Commission said that that the portion of the project attributable to the EPU "cannot serve ratepayers until it is licensed by the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission]" and that "portion of the project should not earn a return before it is used and useful in providing service to ratepayers."[39] The Commission went on to state that the "Company may be allowed to recover those costs in future rate cases once the EPU is in service, subject to the plant being used and useful and subject to a determination that the costs—including cost overruns—were prudent." [40]

Under Minnesota law, a utility is only allowed cost recovery on assets that are used and useful in providing service. The applicable statute states:

> The commission, in the exercise of its powers under this chapter to determine just and reasonable rates for public utilities, shall give due consideration to the public need for adequate, efficient, and reasonable service and to the need of the public utility for revenue sufficient to enable it to meet the cost of furnishing the service, including adequate provision for depreciation of its utility property *used and useful in rendering service to the public*, and to earn a fair and reasonable return upon the investment in such property.[41]

NSP continues to fail to meet its burden to show that the Monticello EPU is used and useful in rendering service to the public. At the time the evidentiary hearings were held in this

[38] Pollock Direct at 20:8-9; Direct Testimony of Anne E. Heuer, Exhibit ___ (AEH-1) at 142.
[39] *In the Matter of the Application of Northern States Power Company for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in the State of Minnesota*, Docket No. E-002/GR-12-961, Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Order, at 19.
[40] *Id.*; *see also* Clark Rebuttal at 23:15-18.
[41] Minn. Stat. § 216B.16, subd. 6.

case, the Monticello plant was operating at pre-uprate levels and NSP could not say with certainty when the plant would be able to operate at full uprate levels. [42] At the end of 2013 and in March 2014 NSP received two required license amendments for the EPU project late last year from the NRC.[43] NSP was not, however, able to immediately begin operating the plant at the full uprate 671 MW level after receiving those license amendments.[44] Instead, NSP was required to complete a power ascension process overseen by the NRC and requiring various interim approvals from the NRC at different stages.[45] The original anticipated schedule for the power ascension process was delayed as a result of issues identified when analyzing data collected during the ascension process.[46] As of the evidentiary hearings, these issues had not yet been resolved to the satisfaction of the NRC.[47] At that time, NSP still believed that the power ascension process could be completed by the end of 2014, but could not confirm that timeline with certainty. [48] During this power ascension process, the plant has operated at no higher than 640 MW and has not operated at that or any pre-uprate levels on a sustainable basis.[49]

As described above, the Commission previously determined that the EPU project was not used and useful in providing service to ratepayers because required license amendments had not yet been approved by the NRC. Although NSP has since received those license amendments, it is still lacking a fundamental prerequisite to operate the EPU project. The power ascension process cannot be completed until NSP completes each step of the process to the satisfaction of the NRC. During cross-examination, NSP witness Timothy O'Connor explained that the Monticello license includes a first-time power ascension process that NSP has to perform the first time NSP raises output from 600 to 671 MW.[50] He further explained that this process is overseen by the NRC and that there are several points in the process that require concurrence or approval from the NRC.[51] As Christopher Clark explained at the evidentiary hearings, "just about everything [NSP does] at [its] nuclear plant is driven by the NRC."[52] Thus, as in the last

[42] Ex. 53, O'Connor Rebuttal at 7:23-27, 8:1-7.
[43] Ex. 53, O'Connor Rebuttal at 4.
[44] Ex. 53, O'Connor Rebuttal at 5:25-27, 6:1-8.
[45] Ex. 53, O'Connor Rebuttal at 6:11-27.
[46] Ex. 53, O'Connor Rebuttal at 10; Ex. 55, O'Connor Surrebuttal at 5.
[47] Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. 1, 232:19-25, 233:1-17.
[48] Ex. 53, O'Connor Rebuttal at 7:23-27, 8:1-7.
[49] Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. 1, 231:18-21.
[50] Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. 1, 228:8-22.
[51] Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. 1, 228:16-22, 231:5-9.
[52] Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. 2, 123:18-19.

case, NSP's ability to operate the EPU project at full uprate levels on an on-going and sustainable basis remains subject to NRC approval. Therefore, there is no real difference between the circumstances now and the circumstances last year on which the Commission based its finding that the EPU project was not yet used and useful.

Since NSP has not demonstrated a substantive change in circumstances since last year, it has not met its burden to justify including Monticello EPU costs in rate base. Determining the appropriate adjustment amount depends on resolution of certain issues in the Monticello prudence review docket,[53] including the percentage of the total Monticello LCM/EPU project attributable to the EPU. In his surrebuttal testimony, Mr. Pollock provided a table illustrating the potential range of adjustments, depending on the cost allocated to the EPU and when the power ascension process is fully complete with final approvals from the NRC.[54] To benefit all ratepayers, the ALJ should find that NSP failed to meet its burden of showing that the EPU project is used and useful and recommend that any EPU costs be excluded from rate base.

D. The ALJ Should Recommend that NSP Promptly Address the Need for Fuel Clause Rider Reform

The Fuel Clause Rider ("FCR") is designed to allow recovery of the cumulative balance of any unrecovered and over-recovered fuel and purchased energy costs incurred in prior months. Significant costs are recovered by NSP via the FCR – NSP anticipates approximately $836 million of costs in 2014.[55] In principle, NSP is required to demonstrate that costs recovered under the FCR are reasonable and prudent. However, the enormous amount of time and resources required to review costs recovered through FCR effectively shifts this burden to regulators and ratepayers. In his direct testimony, Mr. Pollock provided an example of this shift from the Department of Commerce's review of the 2010-2011 (FYE11) Annual Automatic Adjustment (AAA) Reports.[56] After a lengthy review and careful analysis, the Department made three very fair recommendations to disallow a total of $721,700 of increased energy costs incurred during plant outages. But the Commission declined to follow the Department's recommendations, stating that despite diligent and careful analysis by the Department, the record

[53] Minnesota Public Utilities Commission Docket No. E002/CI-13-754.
[54] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 22.
[55] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 28:16-17 (citing Ex. 105, Huso Direct Schedule 5).
[56] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 26.

still did not contain enough detail to resolve disputes of fact necessary to make a determination on the prudence of the utilities' actions.[57] It is difficult to understand what additional information could have been produced in the Department's analysis. Furthermore, it was hard to reconcile the Commission's decision with the statutory directive to resolve doubts in favor of the ratepayer. In any event, the example demonstrates that the current FCR does not effectively place the burden on the utility to show that costs recovered are reasonable and prudent.

Stakeholders have since been discussing FCR reform within and outside of the AAA dockets, but there has been little progress toward meaningful reform. Despite sharing proposals and comments in early 2014, no formal action has been taken by NSP, the Department, or the Commission to implement FCR reform.[58]

In order to address the unfair burden the current FCR review places on regulators and ratepayers, Mr. Pollock proposed that the Commission order NSP to propose a new FCR design in its next rate case or within 90 days of the Commission's final order in this case, whichever is earlier.[59] XLI continues to support this proposal. Further, XLI continues to support that this proposal be guided by the four principles articulated by Mr. Pollock for an incentive-based FCR:

- Establish an effective incentive for NSP to control both fuel and purchased energy costs in a manner that results in overall savings for customers;
- Avoid causing chronic over- or under-recovery without necessarily guaranteeing dollar-for-dollar recovery;
- Emphasize that the burden of proof is on NSP to show that costs recovered are just and reasonable; and
- Allow for administratively efficient review of fuel and purchased energy costs by the Department, the Commission, and customers.[60]

[57] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 26-27 (citing *In the Matter of the Review of the 2010-2011 Annual Automatic Adjustment Reports for All Electric Utilities*, Docket No. E-999/AA-11-792, Order, at 5 (Aug. 16, 2013)). Footnote 4 to this order on page 5 stated: "Before the Commission were seven forced outages where the Department had not withdrawn its recommendation that the Commission order a refund. The Department's recommendations are outlined on pages 68 – 70 of the Department's *Response Comments to Electric Utilities' Response Comments* (December 12, 2012), under the headings: Oil Pump Failure at Sutherland 2, Primary Air Fan Duct Fire at Prairie Creek 4, Coal Bunker Explosion at Black Dog 3, Allen Wrench Falling in the Bus Duct at Allen S. King 1, 'E' Safety Relief Valve Leak at Monticello 1, Incompatible o-rings at Boswell Energy Center 4, and Incorrect assembly of water pump suction valves at Boswell 4."
[58] Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. 2, 125:12-23.
[59] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 29.
[60] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 32:4-12.

In response to Mr. Pollock's testimony, NSP witness Mr. Clark agreed in concept that an incentive-based plan is an appropriate goal for fuel clause reform.[61] However, rather than agree to NSP filing a reform proposal at the end of this case, Mr. Clark recommended that the issue continue to be addressed in the AAA dockets.[62] But Mr. Clark did not identify any specific reasons that NSP could not develop and file a reform proposal within the timeline proposed by XLI other than a preference to keep the discussion in the AAA dockets.[63] He also noted that NSP has had "numerous" internal discussions on the subject.[64] NSP has already invested substantial effort into analyzing FCR reform options and has not identified any specific reason that it cannot proceed with making a formal proposal. Given the lack of progress on FCR reform in the AAA dockets and the general agreement among the parties that an incentive-based mechanism is the appropriate type of reform, there does not appear to be any reason to continue delaying reform.

E. The ALJ Should Recommend Adjustments to NSP's Class Cost of Service Study to Ensure a Just and Reasonable Starting Point for Revenue Allocation and Rate Design

As with the other aspects of NSP's petition for a rate increase, NSP bears the burden of demonstrating its CCOSS is the equitable starting point for designing just and reasonable rates. With one modification explained below, XLI supports using NSP's CCOSS to set rates in this case.

1. Overview of Principles

In general terms, a CCOSS is an analysis used to determine each class's responsibility for a utility's total costs by separating the utility's total costs into portions on behalf of the various customer classes.[65] This analysis consists of the following three steps: (1) a *functionalization* of costs, (2) a *classification* of those costs' primary causative factors, and (3) an *allocation* of those costs among the various customer classes.[66] A utility's investments and expenses are

[61] Ex. 100, Clark Rebuttal at 43:9-10.
[62] Ex. 100, Clark Rebuttal at 43:11-15.
[63] Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. 2, 126:6-10, 16-24.
[64] Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. 2, 125:14-18.
[65] Ex. 101, Peppin Direct at 1.
[66] Ex. 101, Peppin Direct Schedule 2 at 2.

functionalized as production, transmission, distribution, and other functions.[67] Once functionalized, the next step is to determine the primary causative factor (i.e., demand/capacity related, energy related, or customer related).

There are various types of CCOSS methods that can be employed, with the analyst being charged to find the economic theory that is most representative to measure cost-causation.[68] Given the significant portion of costs that are functionalized as production, the manner in which NSP classifies and allocates these costs is critical to a just and reasonable CCOSS. NSP proposes to continue using what it calls the "stratification method" a method that classifies fixed production costs between peak capacity and baseload components by comparing the replacement cost of peaking capacity to the replacement cost of other types of generation.[69] Once a particular CCOSS method is chosen, the next step is to develop allocators that appropriately allocate costs among customer classes.[70] Although XLI does not necessarily endorse it, XLI is not challenging use of the stratification method in this proceeding.[71] Instead, XLI largely supports NSP's proposed CCOSS with modifications described below as the most reasonable and equitable starting point for designing just and reasonable rates.[72]

2. The ALJ Should Recommend Modifying NSP's Methodology for Classifying Production Plant-Related Costs

The modifications to NSP's CCOSS proposed by XLI relate to classification of production plant – in particular the plant stratification factors used to classify plant-related costs between peaking and base load. Stratification identifies plant investment incurred to provide capacity (i.e. demand-related) and investment that is a substitute for fuel costs (i.e. energy-related). NSP described its plant stratification approach as follows:

> The Company classifies fixed production plant into capacity versus energy-related sub-functions. The capacity-related portion of the fixed costs of owned-generation is based on the percent of total fixed costs of each generation type that is equivalent to the costs of a comparable peaking plant (the generation source with the lowest capital costs and the highest operating costs). The percent of total

[67] Ex. 101, Peppin Direct Schedule 2 at 3.
[68] *See generally* Ex. 102, Peppin Direct at 1:27-28, 36:11-26; Ex. 261, Pollock Rebuttal at 18:11-19.
[69] Ex. 102, Peppin Direct at 12-13.
[70] Ex. 101, Peppin Direct Schedule 2.
[71] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 33:4-5.
[72] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 41:9-10.

> generation costs that exceeds the costs of a comparable peaking plant are sub-functionalized as energy-related.[73]

Mr. Pollock identified two flaws in NSP's methodology: 1) NSP uses current replacement value of its existing gas turbine and diesel plants, which is not the same as the costs NSP would incur to install a new peaking unit and 2) NSP's cost classification relies on undepreciated replacement values even though rates are set using net depreciated investment.[74] As demonstrated by Mr. Pollock, the factors used by NSP understate the value of capacity relative to energy, resulting in misallocation of production plant-related costs.

To correct for the first error, Mr. Pollock recommends using costs that NSP would incur to install a new peaking unit. Mr. Pollock recommends using $696/kW, the amount Xcel utilized for determining the capacity credit in its Windsource program.[75]

To correct for the second error, Mr. Pollock recommends using net depreciated investment as opposed to undepreciated investment.[76] Mr. Pollock provided the following example in his direct testimony to show how using the net depreciated cost is a better measure of the value of capacity:

> For example, let's assume a utility has gross production investment of $2,000 and net depreciated investment of $1,000. If the utility installs new capacity at a cost of $500, that capacity addition will result in a 50% increase in rate base, all other things being equal.[77]

Using current net replacement costs sends a stronger price signal because it recognizes the impact capacity additions have on rates, which is measured by the costs of a new capacity addition relative to the utility's existing net production plant.[78] To illustrate how using undepreciated value misallocates production plant-related costs, Mr. Pollock provided another example in his surrebuttal testimony:

> Stratification identifies the plant investment incurred to provide capacity (*i.e.*, which is demand-related) and the investment that is purportedly a substitute for fuel costs (*i.e.*, which is energy-related). For example, assuming the cost of peaking capacity is $100 per kW, but NSP invests $500 per kW in a combined cycle

[73] Ex. 102, Peppin Direct at 12.
[74] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 34-35.
[75] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 34:21-35:1 (citing Peppin Direct, Schedule 10).
[76] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 35:2-4.
[77] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 36:7-10.
[78] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 36:3-6.

> gas turbine (CCGT), the $500 investment is "stratified" 20% ($100 ÷ $500) to demand and 80% ($400 ÷ $500) to energy. However, under the current methodology, this 20%/80% demand/energy split would remain constant for the life of the CCGT. This overstates the "capital substitution" effect.[79]

The overstated capital substitution effect caused by assuming the constant 20%/80% split is shown in the table below:[80]

Illustration Showing How Using Undepreciated Investment Overstates the Capital Substitution Effect				
Net Investment	Peaker Investment	Capital Substitution	Stratification	
			Energy	Capacity
(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)=(3)÷(1)	(5)=(2)÷(1)
$500	$100	$400	80%	20%
$400	$100	$300	75%	25%
$300	$100	$200	67%	33%
$200	$100	$100	50%	50%
$100	$100	$0	0%	100%

Mr. Pollock explained the problem illustrated by the table as follows:

> The example assumes a five-year life of the CCGT (column 1) and no change in the current value of peaking capacity (column 2). The capital substitution effect is quantified in columns 3 and 4. Column 3 is the difference between the net depreciated investment of the CCGT (column 1) and the current value of peaking capacity (column 2). Stratification classifies the capital substitution-related investment to energy (column 4) and the peaker cost to demand (column 5). As can be seen, the capital substitution effect declines as the CCGT is depreciated.[81]

Since the capital substation effect declines as an investment is depreciated, the percentage classified as energy should also decline over the life of the investment.[82]

For all of these reasons XLI recommends that plant stratification analysis be based on depreciated replacement value, consistent with the values shown on Schedule 21 in Mr. Pollock's surrebuttal testimony. Revising NSP's CCOSS to use these revised stratification percentages in the CCOSS would result in reducing the C&I Demand class revenue requirement

[79] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 26:1-10.
[80] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 26.
[81] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 26:15-27:5.
[82] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 27:6-8.

by $19.7 million.[83] XLI's proposed modifications to the CCOSS are consistent with cost causation principles and yield a more just and reasonable allocation to the C&I Demand class.

F. The ALJ Should Recommend Addressing NSP's Uncompetitive Industrial Rates by Setting Rates at the Cost of Service

Again, no witness disputed Mr. Pollock's testimony regarding the increasing uncompetitive rates of NSP's C&I Demand class.[84] Despite agreeing in principle that rates should reflect costs,[85] the Department's proposed 2015 revenue allocation would spread the 2015 increase equally to all customers, which does not move rates closer to cost for all customers.[86] Any revenue allocation that moves C&I Demand rates further from costs will exacerbate the problem. Rates should reflect the actual costs of providing service as closely as possible because, as Mr. Pollock explained in his surrebuttal testimony, "cost based rates are equitable, provide appropriate price signals for all customer classes, encourage conservation and efficiency, and address the very serious and real problem that NSP's industrial rates are not competitive."[87]

Since electricity costs can be a significant component of the cost of production, industrial customers, including XLI members, must be careful of energy use per unit of production in order to remain competitive.[88] For XLI, global competition limits how much increased costs can be passed through in prices.[89] Therefore, increasing already uncompetitive rates[90] has serious consequences for industrial customers and their ability to remain competitive in Minnesota, nationally, and internationally. Uncompetitive industrial rates also have far reaching consequences for other NSP customers. As shown by Mr. Pollock's analysis of NSP's rates,[91] uncompetitive industrial rates lead to declines in sales and overall slow load growth. These consequences ultimately have the effect of pushing up rates for all customers.

The Commission can address these concerns by apportioning any base revenue increase in a manner that would move the C&I Demand rates to cost using the more refined CCOSS

[83] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 29:5-10 & Schedule 22.
[84] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 31:11-13.
[85] Ex. 420, Peirce Direct at 9.
[86] Ex. 261, Pollock Rebuttal at 24:11-15.
[87] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 31:7-10.
[88] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 38:10-14.
[89] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 38:10-14.
[90] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 39:9-10.
[91] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 40.

discussed in Section E, require NSP to file an incentive-based FCR as described in Section D, and implement the rate design proposals described below in Section G.[92]

Moving C&I Demand rates to cost has a range of benefits for industrial customers and other NSP ratepayers. In addition to mitigating effect of uncompetitive rates on sales, moving industrial rates to cost is equitable while also promoting engineering efficiency, stability, and conservation.[93] Rates that reflect cost-of-service principles are equitable because each customer pays what it actually costs the utility to provide service to that customer.[94] Cost-based rates also promote engineering efficiency because well-structured energy and demand charges will provide customers with proper incentives to minimize their costs, which in turn minimize utility costs.[95] Cost-based rates promote stability by aligning customer use patterns with changes in revenue and expenses.[96] Finally, cost-based rates encourage conservation by sending accurate price signals to help customers avoid wasteful or inefficient use.[97]

G. The ALJ Should Address NSP's Uncompetitive Industrial Rates by Recommending Certain Rate Design Changes

In addition to moving rates closer to cost, XLI is proposing several rate design strategies to address NSP's increasingly uncompetitive C&I rates, including (1) setting the short notice demand charge at a fair level, (2) refining the definition of on-peak, and (3) establishing a Renew-A-Source program. Utility rates must be just and reasonable, and it is NSP's burden to prove that that its proposed rates meet that standard. Because the increasingly uncompetitive industrial rates proposed by NSP are not just and reasonable, the Commission should not approve them without also approving the following proposed mitigative rate design strategies.

[92] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 31-32.
[93] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 41:15-18.
[94] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 41:19-42:1.
[95] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 42:3-7.
[96] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 42:8-11.
[97] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 42:12-16.

1. The ALJ Should Recommend Modifying NSP's Proposed Rate Design for Short Notice Demand Customers to Better Reflect the Benefits these Customers Provide

Short notice service is one of several service options that allow NSP to curtail interruptible load when there are insufficient resources to meet customer demand.[98] Short notice customers must have a minimum controllable demand of 3 MW and be willing to interrupt load to a predetermined level within 10 minutes' notice.[99] NSP describes the lower rates paid by short notice interruptible customers as "discounts."[100] However, as Mr. Pollock explained in his direct testimony, such customers pay above-cost rates and do not receive the same quality of service as firm customers.[101] Interruptible customers provide substantial value to NSP and other ratepayers by allowing capacity additions to be deferred and by providing contingency reserves.[102] The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has described interruptible power as providing "insurance" in the event the utility experiences extreme weather, understates load growth, or sustains outages of a major resource.[103] Short notice interruptible customers are compensated in the form of credits against demand charges, the net effect of which is lower demand charges for interruptible customers.

However, NSP is proposing to increase the amount of value of the short notice interruptible credits at less than one-third of the corresponding increase in demand charges.[104] NSP is proposing to increase Tier 1 Short Notice credits by 5.4% while increasing Tier 1 Short Notice demand charges by 19.3%.[105] The net effect of NSP's proposal is to reduce compensation to short notice interruptible customers.

Further, as Mr. Pollock's demonstrates in his direct testimony, NSP's proposal also fails to properly compensate the customers for the capacity value they provide.[106] Again, NSP estimates a new CT would cost approximately $696/kW.[107] The corresponding revenue

[98] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 48:8-10.
[99] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 48:11-13.
[100] Ex. 105, Huso Direct at 26-28.
[101] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 49:3-12.
[102] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 50-51.
[103] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 51-52 (citing and quoting *Louisiana Public Service Commission and the Council of the City of New Orleans v. Entergy Corporation et al*., Docket Nos. EL00-66-000, ER00-2854-000 & EL95-33-002, Opinion No. 468 ¶¶ 74-75 (Mar. 8, 2004)).
[104] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 52-53.
[105] *Id*.
[106] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 53-55.
[107] See supra, pg. 14, Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 53, and Ex. 102, Peppin Direct at Schedule 10.

requirement for this value is $12.16 per kW month.[108] Thus, the average proposed credit of $5.85 is less than half of the cost NSP would incur to provide comparable short-notice generation capacity.[109] Although NSP offered testimony asserting that interruptible load is not directly comparable to a peaking plant,[110] NSP failed to specifically provide any evidence to support that testimony or generally support a more than 50% discount to the actual value of a CT resource.

Assuming that NSP's proposed firm demand charges are approved by the Commission, XLI recommends that short notice interruptible credits be proportionately increased as shown in the chart provided on page 55 of Mr. Pollock's direct testimony. In other words, "if NSP receives only 50% of its proposed base revenue increase, the annualized Short-Notice Peak controlled demand charge should be $4.12 per kW."[111]

2. The ALJ Should Recommend Modifying the Definition of On-Peak to Provide Better Price Signals for Time of Use Customers

Time-of-use rates are intended to send price signals to customers that electricity usage is more expensive during on-peak periods than during off-peak periods.[112] Customers are encouraged by higher prices to minimize usage during on-peak hours and shift load to off-peak hours. NSP's definition of peak periods has remained unchanged for many years even though circumstances impacting the effectiveness of the price signals established by them have changed in recent years. For example, NSP turned over functional control of certain transmission facilities to join MISO in 2002 and revised its demand allocation methodology in the last rate case.[113] MISO recently changed its resource adequacy requirements such that each load serving entity must maintain sufficient capacity to meet the projected annual coincident peak load and provide a sufficient reserve margin.[114] NSP's new demand allocation methodology in its

[108] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 53:9-10. Although NSP Witness Huso was unable to verify this math during cross-examination, XLI notes that the figure is set forth in a calculation on line 5 of Schedule 10 to NSP Witness Peppin's direct testimony.
[109] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 53:10-12.
[110] Ex. 107, Huso Rebuttal at 36:14-15.
[111] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 55:8-10.
[112] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 57-58.
[113] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 56:21-23.
[114] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 56:23-57:1 (citing MISO, *Resource Adequacy Business Practice Manual* § 1.2, at 9 (Aug. 2013)).

CCOSS recognizes that NSP is a predominantly summer-peaking utility and therefore allocates the capacity-related portion of generation plant using the summer coincident peak.[115]

Even though NSP is a predominantly summer-peaking utility, NSP's current definition of peak periods includes non-summer months that are less critical for determining resource adequacy under MISO rules.[116] It would be more consistent with the predominant summer peak and the summer coincident peak demand allocator in NSP's CCOSS to limit the on-peak period to summer months.[117] Further, in his direct testimony, Mr. Pollock included analysis confirming that summer months continue to be predominant for NSP and MISO-wide.[118] If peak periods were confined to summer months, customers would receive stronger price signals and have a greater ability to respond. Under the current peak-period definition (12-hour period on all week days throughout the year), it is difficult for 24-hour customers to respond with any meaningful and sustained changes to their usage patterns.[119] And since NSP's demand-related costs are allocated based on summer coincident demand, refining the definition of peak periods would better reflect cost-causation.[120]

Although NSP has not accepted XLI's proposal to redefine peak periods, at the evidentiary hearings for this case, NSP agreed in principle with XLI's goals in proposing this change. NSP witness Steven Huso "absolutely" agreed that, as a general matter, rates should be designed to reflect proper price signals for efficient use of resources.[121] And further, Mr. Huso agreed that a narrower peak period would provide customers with a greater opportunity to respond and shift load.[122]

3. The ALJ Should Recommend that NSP Promptly Address XLI's Renew-A-Source Tariff Proposal

In his direct testimony, Mr. Pollock proposed that NSP establish a new renewable energy purchase option for industrial customers. In particular, he recommended establishing "Renew-A-Source" program that pairs large high-load factor customers that operate 24 hours a day with

[115] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 57:5-8 (citing Docket No. E002/GR-12-961, Rebuttal Testimony and Schedules of Michael A. Peppin, Exhibit ___ (MAP-2), at 3).
[116] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 58:3-8.
[117] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 58:10-12 & Schedule 14.
[118] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 58:13-22.
[119] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 41:1-15.
[120] Ex. 263, Pollock Surrebuttal at 40:14-21.
[121] Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. 2, 166:1-4.
[122] Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. 2, 175:13-15.

renewable energy resources, such as wind, that primarily operate during off-peak hours.[123] Such a program could "match" the output of a defined portfolio of renewable resources with a qualifying customer's load under a long-term agreement.[124] If well-structured, renewable energy could be made affordable to industrial customers while also driving down the price of renewable resources by creating a new and stable source of long-term demand for them.[125] Mr. Pollock's testimony included detailed proposals for the structure of the program that can provide the basis for further discussions with NSP.[126]

NSP has expressed its commitment to pursue discussions with stakeholders of XLI's Renew-A-Source proposal and even described the idea as a "very exciting opportunity."[127] However, NSP also recommended against establishing a firm timeline for commencing such discussions or making a specific tariff proposal.[128] In order to insure that this concept moves forward, XLI continues to recommend that the Commission order NSP to work with interested stakeholders to develop a Renew-A-Source tariff or similar program in a set timeframe. However, since Mr. Clark expressed willingness to discuss such a timeframe during the evidentiary hearings, XLI also remains open to discussion regarding the appropriate timeframe to establish. If no agreement is reached on the timeframe, XLI recommends that the Commission adopt XLI's original proposal, which was that NSP be ordered to file a Renew-A-Source or similar tariff in its next rate case or within 60 days of the final order in this case, whichever is earlier.

III. CONCLUSION

XLI appreciates NSP's efforts in preparing the Issues Statement. As explained in detail above, the ALJ should modify NSP's proposals as follows in the ALJ's recommendation to the Commission:

- The substantial nuclear depreciation reserve surplus should be amortized over five years, resulting in a $25.7 million reduction to NSP's proposed 2014-2015 revenue requirement;

[123] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 59-60.
[124] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 60-61.
[125] Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 61.
[126] *See* Ex. 260, Pollock Direct at 61-62.
[127] Ex. 100, Clark Rebuttal at 47-48; Evidentiary Hearing Transcript, Vol. 2, 133:13 (Clark).
[128] Ex. 100, Clark Rebuttal at 47-48.

- The EPU portion of the Monticello LCM/EPU project should be excluded from the rate base until it is used and useful in rendering service to ratepayers;
- XLI's proposal to modify NSP's CCOSS should be adopted because it yields more equitable results founded on cost-causation principles under the just and reasonable standard;
- NSP should be ordered to file an incentive-based FCR reform proposal in its next rate case or within 90 days of the final order in this case in order to establish an effective mechanism to ensure that fuel and purchased energy costs recovered through the FCR are reasonable and prudent;
- Rates should be set at cost of service; and
- To ensure that rates are just and reasonable, XLI's rate design proposals should be adopted in order to address NSP's increasingly uncompetitive industrial rates.

Respectfully submitted,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Sharla Backer, hereby certify that I have this day served a true and correct copy of the following document to all persons at the addresses indicated below or on the attached list by electronic filing, electronic mail, courier, interoffice mail or by depositing the same enveloped with postage paid in the United States Mail at Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Post-Hearing Brief

In the Matter of the Application of Northern States Power Company for Authority to Increase Rates for Electric Service in the State of Minnesota

MPUC Docket No. E-002/GR-13-868
OAH Docket No. 2500-31182

Dated this 23rd day of September, 2014.

/s/ Sharla Backer
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James M.	Strommen	jstrommen@kennedy-graven.com	Kennedy & Graven, Chartered	470 U.S. Bank Plaza 200 South Sixth Street Minneapolis, MN 55402	Electronic Service	No	OFF_SL_13-868_Official CC Service List
SaGonna	Thompson	Regulatory.Records@xcelenergy.com	Xcel Energy	414 Nicollet Mall FL 7 Minneapolis, MN 554011993	Electronic Service	Yes	OFF_SL_13-868_Official CC Service List
Kari L	Valley	kari.l.valley@xcelenergy.com	Xcel Energy Service Inc.	414 Nicollet Mall FL 5 Minneapolis, MN 55401	Electronic Service	Yes	OFF_SL_13-868_Official CC Service List
Samantha	Williams	swilliams@nrdc.org	Natural Resources Defense Council	20 N. Wacker Drive Ste 1600 Chicago, IL 60606	Electronic Service	No	OFF_SL_13-868_Official CC Service List
Patrick	Zomer	Patrick.Zomer@lawmoss.com	Moss & Barnett a Professional Association	150 S. 5th Street, #1200 Minneapolis, MN 55402	Electronic Service	No	OFF_SL_13-868_Official CC Service List