

From: [Kristen Eide-Tollefson](#)
To: [Staff, CAO \(PUC\)](#)
Subject: Comments to Xcel Nuclear Waste Docket OAH 25-25000-39971
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Attachments: [PINGP STUDY GROUP - FEIS Comments 2025 Storage expansion FINAL.pdf](#)
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PINGP STUDY GROUP - critical issues for PUC Docket Number(s):
E-002/CN-24-68 OAH Docket Number: 25-2500-39971

Thank you for the opportunity to submit comments to these dockets. I apologize for the unconventional citation format, integrating links into the comments.

Respectfully submitted,

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PINGP STUDY GROUP - critical issues for PUC Docket Number(s): E-002/CN-24-68 OAH Docket Number: 25-2500-39971

Commenter profile – Kristen Eide-Tollefson for the **PINGP STUDY GROUP:**

The commenter has been following and participating in proceedings related to the PINGP nuclear plant since 1995, when she was appointed to the EQB Citizen Advisory Task Force for Dry Cask Storage at an alternative site in Florence Township where she resides. She was assigned by the chair of the task force to research and make recommendations on related legal, regulatory and legislative issues. She also organized local participation in the environmental review scoping. The Florence Township site was released in 1996 from both of Xcel's state and federal applications for what would have been the first offsite ISFSI in the country.

Eide-Tollefson has participated in legislative initiatives, regulatory proceedings and coalition collaborations for over 20 years, representing the local community group *Communities United for Responsible Energy* (CURE). This participation includes nuclear regulatory and IRP dockets, EQB and PUC rulemaking, and nuclear waste and energy planning reports. Carol Overland represented CURE throughout the dry cask proceedings.

In 2009 EERA/DOC created a local citizen task force for environmental review of Xcel's application to uprate the PINGP plant and expand storage to run through 2033/4. The commenter, for CURE, supported interested participants in a study group on Saturdays following the meetings, where they could talk with each other and access background information and related documentation. This resulted in the initiative of participants to develop a report clarifying community concerns and requests for information development. The report was led and written by the mayor of Lake City, a member of the task force.

The PINGP STUDY GROUP, was granted informal participant status by PUC in the CON. It was represented by attorney Paula Maccabee, with supporting briefs and the development of expert testimony on key issues laid out in the study group report, shared by the surrounding communities, the Prairie Island Indian Community and Red Wing. Eide-Tollefson supported this representation.

6. 20098-41095-02	Public	08-510 (CN)	VARIOUS PARTIES	8/24/2009
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In 2014, Eide-Tollefson was appointed as one of the 5 citizen members of the Environmental Quality Board (EQB), where she served two 4 year terms, through January 2022. She suspended advocacy work during this period. In 2022, Eide-Tollefson developed comments on the SEIS for Xcel Energy's Request for a Change in Spent Fuel Storage Technology Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Docket No. E002/CN-08-510. The change from 9" steel-walled casks to 5/8" thick cannisters is for "cost savings", a questionable priority given the indeterminate timeline of storage and uncertainty of the legality of consolidated private interim storage.

Issues involving the expansion of waste storage at Prairie Island have changed little throughout this period. The FEIS and SEIS to the 2009 and 2021 proceedings and comments to these previous dockets are relevant to the present proceeding. **The history of nuclear waste authorization in Minnesota** bears review in the ALJ's report. After the 1994 legislation, the most consequential debate was in 2003 when the 17 cask cap on waste storage was going to be lifted, or the plant shut down. Mike **Bull's Legislative Information Brief on Nuclear Power and Xcel's 2002 IRP** brilliantly outlines the debate with background and topics highly relevant to the present proceeding. Xcel's 2002 IRP provided the most developed set of alternatives to the PINGP that had been seen to date.

<https://www.house.mn.gov/hrd/pubs/nucxcel.pdf>

From the report: "The administrative law judge (Klein) in the CON proceeding on the ISFSI at Prairie Island found that "The Yucca Mountain storage facility would reach maximum capacity under current storage schedules before all of Prairie Island's waste is taken." Xcel has confirmed that this is still true (in 2002).

Topics for Comment:

- **Should the Commission find that the Final Environmental Impact Statement is adequate?** No.

An EIS is an analytic document. The FEIS does not meet this standard, primarily because it fails to develop sufficient information or issues for analysis. The FEIS presents only vague scenarios without data or documentation. It fails to utilize or cite official reports to fully inform decision-makers of the current status of the legal, political and economic viability of centralized storage options. The dangerously naive representations and assumptions of the FEIS undermine the validity of its conclusions, betray Minnesota environmental statute and rule, and endanger the long-term well-being of the state's people, waters, and natural resources.

The FEIS errs in its basic assumptions:

Storage is not "Temporary" – The FEIS refers to ISFSI storage as "temporary storage" at 7.4 (p. 91):

"Spent fuel storage at nuclear plants is considered temporary, with the ultimate goal being permanent disposal".

And again, at 6.2 (p. 76- 77):

... "the analysis here assumes the *temporary, long-term storage* of spent fuel in the PINGP ISFSI for up to 200 years. This assumption is strictly for analysis purposes and is used to bound the uncertainty associated with the eventual availability of an off-site storage facility."

This terminology is both internally contradictory and wholly inaccurate. NRC long ago revised its terms to reference “indefinite storage at reactor sites”. This misleading assumption underlies the fundamental inadequacy of the FEIS to provide accurate information and analysis.

Assuming an eventual offsite alternative, the FEIS fails to adequately investigate and accurately describe the risk of indeterminate (potentially permanent) storage at the doorstep of the Prairie Island Indian Community, on the banks of the Mississippi River. This risk is *the most* consequential factor in potentially significant future environmental, social, and financial impacts.

Representing vague scenarios, without data or documentation, the FEIS fails to utilize or cite official reports that would more fully inform decision-makers of the current status of the legal, political, and economic viability of centralized storage options. Because the legislature no longer receives semi-annual Nuclear Waste Reports. Decision-makers are not well informed of the realities of the ongoing failure of centralized ‘solutions’ and the implications for our state, which was a key feature of the Nuclear Waste Report. The last report was submitted by EQB in 2007.

Each new federal and private initiative, before it fails, generates false promises and hope that support the continued expansion of waste inventories. Meanwhile high-level nuclear waste remains stranded at reactor sites, growing beyond the capacity of any centralized storage plan.

The dangerously naive representations and assumptions of the FEIS undermine the validity of its conclusions, betray Minnesota’s environmental statute and rule, and endanger the public interest. See citations under CON question 2 for recent official reports.

Restricted information base: It is a major flaw in a decision-making proceeding of such consequence that the FEIS does not utilize or reference points of information beyond the limited and self-referential sources cited at 1.6, and in chapter footnotes:

“1.6 The primary sources of information for this EIS are:

- Xcel Energy’s CN application.
- The scoping environmental assessment worksheet (EAW) prepared for Xcel Energy’s proposed additional spent fuel storage in the PINGP ISFSI. 7
- New and additional information from Xcel Energy sent to the Department’s Energy Environmental Review and Analysis (EERA) unit in personal email communication regarding its CN application. 8

- The 2009 PINGP ISFSI Final EIS and the 2022 Supplemental EIS.

The information base for each section of the FEIS is similarly restricted. A consequential example is the Alternative Replacement Plan ‘analysis’ (p. 96): Alternatives to Continued Operation of the PINGP:

“The replacement scenario modeled by Xcel Energy is the only scenario discussed in this EIS (Appendix A). Other replacement scenarios are possible.”

Restricted Alternatives analysis. Alternatives play an essential role in the development of the environmental review and decision-making record. This section tests the proposed project against state statute and rule, and informs CON considerations of size, type and timing etc. The National Bar Association calls it as “the heart of the EIS.”

ALTERNATIVES: MN Rule 4410.2300 CONTENT OF EIS.

G. “Alternatives: the EIS shall compare the potentially significant impacts of the proposal with those of other reasonable alternatives to the proposed project. The EIS must address one or more alternatives of each of the following types of alternatives or provide a concise explanation of why no alternative of a particular type is included in the EIS: alternative sites, alternative technologies, modified designs or layouts, modified scale or magnitude, and alternatives incorporating reasonable mitigation measures identified through comments received during the comment periods for EIS scoping or for the draft EIS.”

1. Alternative Storage Technologies: Thin or Thick walled casks

The PINGP submitted extensive scoping comments and final comments to the 2021 proceeding on Xcel’s application to use any cask approved by NRC without further PUC review or approval. EERA determined that a supplemental EIS was necessary.

The issues raised are highly relevant to this docket and to the consideration of technology alternatives. PUC did not authorize any particular cask. The order provided that the choice of cask is up to Xcel. The rationale for the change to thin-walled casks was ‘cost’ savings. The cannister system proposed to be used is made by same the company that is proposing a private consolidated storage facility, now undergoing multiple legal challenges.

There are still NUHOMES thick-walled casks to load through 2026. A change to the thin-walled cannister system would follow. If consolidated private storage is rejected by the courts, it would be prudent for Xcel with the Commission to reevaluate the risks and benefits of introducing a different technology. The NUHOMES casks on Prairie Island are more robust than cannister systems for free-standing dry cask storage and are licensed for transportation by NRC.

PINGP Study Group comments on Alternate Cask Storage technology

9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 20223-183649-03 	Public	08-510 (CN)	DOC	Written Comments PINGP STUDY GROUP 3/20/2022
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This power point from the San Ofreo decommissioning docket is included in the PINGP Study Group comment above. It summarizes extensive evidence-based testimony on thin-walled versus thick-walled cask alternatives. It is also accessed via the NRC docket below:

<https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2103/ML21036A015.pdf>

2. Alternative replacement plans examined in the FEIS:

“The replacement scenario modeled by Xcel Energy is the only scenario discussed in this EIS (Appendix A). Other replacement scenarios are possible.”

CON Rules 216b.243 https Subd. 3. Showing required for construction.

No proposed large energy facility shall be certified for construction unless the applicant can show that demand for electricity cannot be met more cost effectively through energy conservation and load-management measures and unless the applicant has otherwise justified its need. In assessing need, the commission shall evaluate:

(1) the accuracy of the long-range energy demand forecasts on which the necessity for the facility is based;

Need claims: Without the first showing required in CON Rules 216b.243, Subd. 3, (1) it is not possible to accurately assess alternative replacement plans.

Carol Overland has pressed this issue for years. Former PUC chair Garvey once asked intervenors, “is no one going to challenge this need claim?” As Overland stated at the public hearing, there is a difference between “need” for reliable service and claims of need based upon the IRP, Xcel’s ‘preferred’ business plan, and state energy policy goals. While IRP analysis is rigorous, the underlying need claim is the utility’s representation.

Alternatives development: The Commission has increasingly encouraged private negotiations between interested parties and the utility to inform its decision options. New ‘streamlining’ laws push public interests not represented by these parties, even further to the edges of Commission proceedings, as the state closes in on its renewable resource

objectives. While outlined in participation opportunities documents (see 2020 Auditor's report on PUC Public Participation) the bar for advancing an "alternative" has become very high, shifting the burden for technical development from the utility to the public. This requires resources far beyond the reach of interested parties without the funding to meet the bar in new rule 7849.0110.

The FEIS fails to consider the combined cycle gas replacement at the plant site, an alternative referenced in multiple Xcel documents as far back as 2003. And fully developed with respect to the requirements of rule. The independent study commissioned for this alternative by Xcel was submitted by CURE in DEIS comments. This alternative is within the scope as a 'replacement plan'.

The attorney for CURE raised the issue at the public hearing that the FEIS failed to include, analyze, or recommend an update of Xcel's independent study of the Prairie Island replacement plan of 2002, as an alternative to extended operations and waste expansion.

The subsequent discussion with Steve Rakow (Commerce) revealed that EERA constrained the scope of alternatives to a selection of options in the present IRP. The Prairie Island Combined Cycle Gas Conversion Replacement Plan is within scope. The PINGP Study Group requests that a requirement to update this replacement plan – attached to the CURE comments --- be added to the alternatives under consideration in the case.

Mitigations. Another key provision of the EIS. Where are they discussed?

2. Should the Commission grant a Certificate of Need to Xcel Energy for additional dry cask storage at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant? PUC Docket Number E002/CN-24-68 3 | Page.

No.

The CON involves four interconnected actions that Xcel is pursuing to:

- Switch from the NUHOMES 9" steel-walled storage casks to a 5/8" thin-walled cannister system made by Holtec. The stated goals, as noted in the FEIS, are to save money and coordinate with Holtec's consolidated private storage initiative, licensed by NRC for 40 years, currently suspended by multiple legal challenges <https://apnews.com/article/supreme-court-nuclear-waste-texas-new-mexico-a426602c562f3a43696f0a2a9760ffde>
- Push the operating life of the highly profitable but aging plant out to 80 years;
- Double the number of casks stored on site from 64 to at least 127, with decommissioning wastes; and
- Reduce decommissioning fund accruals from 21 million to 3 million annually.

The FEIS correctly states the

3 key questions for evaluating the environmental, social and economic costs and benefits in the Certificate of Need proceeding for continued expansion of waste storage:

- **Term of storage:** Given the record of failed attempts to create a centralized permanent or interim site, what evidence is there that the waste will not be stored indefinitely or permanently at Prairie Island on the banks of the Mississippi River?

In 1993-95 the state's legal and legislative apparatus grappled with this essential question. Judge Klein's rejection of the Commission's decision warned of the dangers of "ongoing expansion of waste stranded at reactor sites" becoming ad hoc permanent storage.

In addition to discussion in this comment, two relevant historic documents from Judge Klein's deliberations and the legislative debate are linked for your review.

<https://www.lrl.mn.gov/webcontent/lrl/guides/nuclear%20waste/amicusbrief.pdf>

<https://www.lrl.mn.gov/webcontent/lrl/guides/nuclear%20waste/oahnsp41092.pdf>

- **Waste inventories and costs:** Who will ultimately bear the risks and costs of indefinite at reactor site storage? How long can we expect the current institutions, federal government and utility, to remain responsible for the 3 essentials: monitoring, management and funding? What is the back up? What costs might be left to the state and communities to bear?

CON Rules 216b.243 (12) if the applicant is proposing a nonrenewable generating plant, the applicant's assessment of the risk of environmental costs and regulation on that proposed facility over the expected useful life of the plant, including a proposed means of allocating costs associated with that risk.

By 2011, waste inventories had already exceeded the planned capacity and legal cap on Yucca Mountain. Both official and media reports demonstrate how little impetus there is to resolve a waste problem that is growing exponentially by an estimated 2000 metric tons a year. Costs of indeterminate, long-term storage are compounding at a rate even greater than waste inventories, due to the lack of coordination of multiple strategies, and lack of R&D for indefinite storage: (technology, security, monitoring, management; transfer and periodic replacement of casks/cannisters and facilities).

This predicament is discussed in the 2024 report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy, from the U.S. NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD Evaluating the U.S. Department of Energy Research and Development Activities on The Disposition of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel in Dual-purpose Canisters

[https://www.nwtrb.gov/our-work/reports/evaluation-of-the-u.s.-department-of-energy-research-and-development-activities-on-the-disposition-of-commercial-spent-nuclear-fuel-in-dual-purpose-canisters-\(february-2024\)](https://www.nwtrb.gov/our-work/reports/evaluation-of-the-u.s.-department-of-energy-research-and-development-activities-on-the-disposition-of-commercial-spent-nuclear-fuel-in-dual-purpose-canisters-(february-2024))

“3.1 From 2008 through 2022, an average of more than 190 dry-storage casks per year were loaded at nuclear power plant sites (Freeze et al. 2021; UxC 2022, 2023b). As of June 1, 2023, almost 4,000 dry-storage casks are in service at ISFSIs (UxC 2023a). Freeze et al. (2021) estimated that about 10,000 dry-storage casks will be needed to store SNF discharged from nuclear power plants by 2080, when all SNF from the final shutdown reactors will have been transferred to dry storage ...

3.1.1 DOE Research- As of June 2023, there is no DOE R&D activity specifically addressing indefinite storage (more than 80–120 years) of SNF at ISFSIs.”

These realities, among many others, belie the assumptions of the NRC’s 2014 Generic EIS, cited by the FEIS at page 80:

- Spent fuel canisters would be replaced every 100 years.
- To facilitate this replacement, a dry transfer system (DTS) would be constructed at each ISFSI to repackage spent fuel
- ISFSI and DTS facilities would be replaced every 100 years.
- Institutional controls would remain in place for all analysis timeframes.
- All spent fuel would be moved from spent fuel pools to dry storage by the end of the short-term storage timeframe (60 years).”

The FEIS continues with the conclusion: “Analysis in the generic EIS indicated that most all potential human and environmental impacts of continued storage of spent nuclear fuel would be small. Though the NRC analyzed a scenario in the EIS reflecting indefinite storage in an ISFSI, the NRC believes that the most likely scenario for spent fuel storage is the availability of a federal, geologic repository within 60 years of a reactor’s licensed lifetime.

Programmatic implementation and funding do not exist for any of these highly unrealistic assumptions to date. It is unknown whether the burgeoning costs of nuclear waste management will be supported by this or future administrations. The Commission’s duty is to critically assess present and future financial and environmental risks and benefits; and act to protect the state’s ratepayers and resources. The FEIS does not provide the basis of information required for this assessment.

Two articles from 2010-11 show how little things have changed.

<https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/US-utilities,-regulators-sue-DoE-over-waste-fund>; <https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna42219616>:

“Users pay as taxpayers, too — for dry storage. Utilities that have run out of storage space in pools successfully sued the federal government for breach of contract, because it failed to keep to the 1998 deadline to establish long-term storage. **By law, the money for dry casks cannot come from the nuclear waste fund, and must come from the federal budget.**”

While discussing funding for nuclear waste maintenance at the hearing, Pam Gorman’s comments implied that the Nuclear Waste Fund pays and will continue to pay for storage costs incurred due to the failure of the federal program. This is not accurate. A thorough overview of all these factors is provided in a **2021 Congressional Report on Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal**, which confirms and explains the situation noted above.

<https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL33461>

There is no responsible, safe storage of nuclear waste without adequate funding.

The state must retain, by exercising it, PUC’s regulatory authority over economic decisions related to nuclear power and waste disposal. In this and associated proceedings, *the Commission must consider the possibility that the federal government will not indefinitely repay utility costs, and that decommissioning funds may be the only source of funding for indefinite storage*, including associated costs of periodic replacement of casks and ISFSI facilities, which will require dry transfer systems that are exceedingly costly to develop.

- **Storage Technology and radioactive half-lives:**

Impact to ratepayers? Given the enduring dangers of radioactive elements to be contained for an “indeterminate period” at reactor site ISFSIs in dry cask storage, how should we view priorities of storage technologies? What if the Consolidated Interim Storage initiative, like all the initiatives before it, fails? Will the less robust container technology, which relies on concrete casing for shielding, prove effective for hundreds or thousands of years? Will utilities retain legal responsibility for the waste, as required by the national RWMA, if they are moved offsite to a privately owned facility? How will all this impact ratepayers?

The attached AI inquiry for technical information pertaining to the ex

“U.S Spent power reactor fuel contains some of the world’s largest concentrations of artificial radioactivity. (1) 23 billion curies ($8.51\text{E}+20$ Bq) of long-lived radioactivity (>20 times more than generated by the U.S. nuclear weapons program). (2) About 9.2 billion curies ($3.4\text{E}+20\text{Bq}$) of cesium-137(350 times more than released by all

atmospheric nuclear weapons tests); and (3) About 700 metric tons of plutonium (about 3 times more than used for weapons throughout the world).”


The 2021 GAO Office Report on *Commercial Nuclear Waste* discusses the steep cost curve of unresolved and uncoordinated storage initiatives and technologies.

<https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-603>

“The United States currently has an ad hoc system for managing commercial spent nuclear fuel, which can affect future disposal decisions and costs. For example, spent fuel is stored using a variety of different technologies that will have implications for final disposal.”

This point is made in PINGP comments to the 2021 proceeding (linked above) regarding the potential complications of combining cask and container technologies on Prairie Island. Projected costs for 100 year replacement of casks and cannisters, including technology to transfer rods to new containers, deal with damaged rods; and replacement of ISFSI facilities are in the billions. Are these costs accurately represented in the Triennial Decommissioning report?

Figure: Department of Energy Total Estimated Costs and Remaining Liabilities for Storing Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF), in Billions of Dollars



Source: GAO analysis of Department of Energy financial reports. | GAO-21-603

3. If granted, what additional conditions or requirements should be considered for inclusion in the Certificate of Need?

If the CON for continued operations and expanded storage is legally permitted by PUC, the likelihood predicted by Judge Klein in his 1993 report that the waste would never be removed is becoming reality.

A. Provision for ongoing long-term evaluation and oversight of nuclear waste stranded at reactor sites in Minnesota needs to be moved to the forefront of state, utility and PUC planning.

- **Collaboration** with the Prairie Island Indian Community and Red Wing is essential;
- **A public forum** that includes interested parties and members of the public should be held at least annually – by Xcel, with NRC and responsible state agencies.
- **An independent facilitator** needs to be paid for by Xcel to ensure unbiased treatment and independent development of issues and concerns, as recommended by the PINGP Study Group in the 2009 proceedings.
- **EQB needs to act** upon its responsibilities under the state's Radioactive Waste Management Act. It should resume, design and implement a Nuclear Waste Management Program with annual reporting to the Legislature. It is important to have an independent platform for these issues. The MEQB alone provides public access to state agency heads and the ability for anyone to provide input on issues that affect the state's resources, as all are charged under MERA, 116B.01.
<https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/116B.01>
- **Reactivating the Nuclear Waste Council for state oversight** remains an option for the legislature to direct and fund. The Council was put into place in the 1980s to protect the state from federal citing

It is essential to have an independent platform for state and local institutional oversight. All the nuclear waste environmental reviews from at least 2009 on, note that this is the only way to mitigate potentially disastrous effects of radiological releases over time.

The Prairie Island Indian Community has borne the brunt of advocacy for federal action. The state's Department of Public Service under Kris Sanda once had a very effective program which advocated and educated on state interests in nuclear matters. PUC's involvement in NARUC and the Nuclear Waste Strategy Coalition is important, but the ultimate responsibility for nuclear waste in Minnesota lies with the Legislature.

B. 200 years. Xcel has been directed by PUC and is integrating a 200 year timeline into its waste management projections. In light of PUC direction given to Xcel and outlined in their 2022-24 Triennial Decommissioning plan, Xcel must develop and share public facing

documentation of these long-term plans. They must be clear and accessible, accurate and complete – estimating projected costs, funding sources, timelines and associated monitoring and management provisions. Anything else is a ‘shell game’, the kind where you hide a pea under shells, and move the shells around to confuse and evade detection.

C. Provisions to be integrated into relevant proceedings- joint report to PUC:

When the recommendation for an ongoing oversight provision arose in the 2021 proceeding, it was supported by EERA/DOC and is referenced in the 2025 FEIS.

The PUC chair was opposed to including it in the CON conditions. Commissioner Sullivan interceded and suggested that further discussion be included in the next Triennial Decommissioning Plan: 08-510 Order 10/05/2022 [202210-189557-01](#)

“The Commission recognizes the importance of institutional controls concerning spent nuclear fuel. The Commission will solicit comments on improving public input regarding new or existing planning processes that address new or existing institutional controls in the next Triennial decommissioning docket.”

At page 12 the 2022-2024 Triennial Decommissioning Report Xcel discusses:

THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE UTILITY HOLDING SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TO STATE AND LOCAL HOST COMMUNITIES RELATED TO DECOMMISSIONING AND STORAGE
<https://www.lrl.mn.gov/docs/2023/mandated/230666.pdf>

The page lists 3 initiatives called for by PUC or PIIC. Where are these reports? And when were these discussions? Despite being closely involved with the issues and dockets for decades the commenter has never been contacted to participate.

In Docket No. E-002/11-939, the Commission required Xcel Energy to work with the host communities and the Prairie Island Indian Community (PIIC) prior to the next triennial filing to address the requirement to evaluate the cost, if any, arising from the storage of spent nuclear fuel to the state, tribal, and local governments once the plants are no longer operating. The Commission required Xcel Energy to file periodic status reports on those discussions.

- In Docket No. E-002/14-761, the Commission required Xcel Energy to continue working with its host communities, and that in its next nuclear decommissioning filing, Xcel Energy develop 60, 100, and 200-year plans for the City of Red Wing to enable better communications with the city and foster an understanding of the long-term safety-related costs of spent fuel storage on host communities.

- “Most recently, in Docket No. E-002/M-17-828, the PIIC filed comments expressing strong concern that spent nuclear fuel will remain at the Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (ISFSI) for many years following discontinuation of generation from the plant, with little assurance of a specific timeline given the Federal government’s inaction on permanent storage”

What condition would consolidate these requirements so that they could be tracked, and accountable?

Conditions to consider to address Environmental Justice:

An article on *Emerging Environmental Justice Issues in Nuclear Power and Radioactive Contamination* (2016) confirms the scope of concerns expressed in comments from the Prairie Island Indian Community <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4962241/>

Minnesota has placed a priority on environmental justice. Progress in this matter over the last 10 years is not reflected in the FEIS. We appreciate EERA consultation with PIIC for the present review. Unfortunately, as stated repeatedly in comments to the 2009, 2021, and 2024/5 dockets the discussion of Environmental Justice in the FEIS remains wholly inadequate.

Respecting the provisions for, and PIIC’s active engagement in, its consulting rights and roles -- it is regrettable that this section is so dismissive of the issues:

- CURE’s comments informing the record of new developments in the health effects of low-level radiation exposure were dismissed.
- The palpable anguish in comments about health impacts from PIIC community members is dismissed with “Thank you for your comment”.

Mitigation of EJ issues: There was no discussion in the FEIS of possible paths to mitigation for the unique situation of the PIIC, as the closest community to reactor operations and storage in the country.

An ongoing mediated/facilitated independent platform for discussions between the Tribe and Xcel, funded but not controlled by Xcel was recommended in PINGP Study Group comments to the 2009 docket. All items under 3A above are relevant to this discussion.

4. Requesting ALJ review of legislative requirements and agency responsibilities:

The Nuclear Waste Management Reports:

<https://www.eqb.state.mn.us/sites/eqb/files/documents/NuclearReport.pdf>

Background: “In 1988, Minnesota Statutes were amended to require the Office of Strategic and LongRange Planning to report annually to the Legislature on activities by the federal government relating to the federal high level radioactive waste disposal program (Minnesota Statutes section 116C.712, subdivision 5). The Office of Strategic and Long Range Planning has prepared an annual report since 1987. The last report was prepared in June 2000. These reports are all available at the Minnesota Legislative Reference Library.” <https://www.eqb.state.mn.us/sites/eqb/files/documents/NuclearReport.pdf>

The Minnesota Environmental Quality Board is responsible for Nuclear Waste matters under 116C.701-116C.83.

When the Long Range Planning Office was abolished by Governor Pawlenty in 2003, the reporting requirement fell to EQB. “The Environmental Quality Board reports each year to the Legislature on federal activities to construct and operate a national repository for management of high-level radioactive wastes “ The waste report was not separately funded. The last report was submitted to the Legislature in 2007.

Despite the authorities and responsibilities assigned to it under 116C.701-116C.83, MEQB has not had an active Radioactive Waste Management Program for two decades. The transfer of the Power Plant Siting staff of EQB to EERA at DOC -- and now to PUC – has created programmatic complications for Nuclear Waste oversight in Minnesota.

Transfer of Routing and Siting from EQB to PUC: Effective July 1, 2005, Article 3 of the energy bill S.F.1368 transferred power plant and wind turbine siting, transmission line and pipeline routing authority from the Minnesota Environmental Quality Board (EQB) to the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (PUC).

The same law transfers the energy facility permitting staff from the EQB to the Minnesota Department of Commerce. PUC testified In 2005 that they were concerned to assure the independence of environmental review group. The Environmental Quality board staff was transferred to DOC (Ed Garvey) as the EERA Energy Environmental Review & Analysis group.

Responsibility for 116C.701-116C.83 was not transferred. And responsibility for mandatory environmental review for expanded waste storage remained under EQB in rule until 2024, when EQB rule changes transferred the review provision to PUC which now houses the ‘independent’ environmental review staff (EERA).

Addendum – Nuclear is not a renewable resource 216B.243 Showing for CON.

Subd 3a. The commission may not issue a certificate of need under this section for a large energy facility that generates electric power by means of a nonrenewable energy

source, unless the applicant for the certificate has demonstrated to the commission's satisfaction that it has explored the possibility of generating power by means of renewable energy sources and has demonstrated that the alternative selected is less expensive, including environmental costs, than power generated by a renewable energy source. For purposes of this subdivision, "renewable energy source" includes hydro, wind, solar, and geothermal energy and the use of trees or other vegetation as fuel.

Regardless of its role in the state's policy goals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, nuclear power does not qualify as a renewable resource. Nor is it an emissions-free energy resource as is sometimes claimed. Nuclear power plants produce a range of operational emissions, including radioactive isotopes in the form of gaseous and liquid releases:

Tritium (H-3), a byproduct of neutron interaction with lithium or boron in the reactor, is released through venting or as part of water discharge, in both gaseous and liquid forms. It releases low-energy beta radiation, which can be hazardous if inhaled, ingested or absorbed through the skin.

The worst tritium releases at Prairie Island have involved tritiated water leaks from pipes in the plant's systems, with notable incidents occurring in 2004, 2010, and 2013. While these releases were serious, they were contained within the plant's site and did not result in significant off-site contamination. The plant's operators have responded with corrective measures, and the releases have generally been managed within the regulatory frameworks set by the NRC and state agencies.

- The well at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant that was affected by tritium contamination was replaced in **2014**. This well, which was part of the plant's monitoring system, had shown elevated levels of tritium in the groundwater, which was linked to a leak at the facility. This was part of a larger effort to address groundwater contamination from the tritium leaks that had been detected in previous years (notably in 2010 and 2013).

Carbon Dioxide (CO₂): While nuclear reactors themselves do not directly produce significant amounts of CO₂ during operation, the full lifecycle of nuclear energy, including uranium mining, fuel processing, plant construction, and waste management, does produce CO₂ emissions.

Other emissions released in small amounts, include the Noble Gases, like krypton and xenon; Iodine-131 and Cesium-137 and Radon.

Cooling Water and Thermal Pollution: Nuclear plants often use large amounts of water for cooling. The process of discharging the heated water back into nearby rivers, lakes, or

oceans can raise the temperature of those water bodies, affecting local ecosystems. This is known as thermal pollution.

Chatgpt on nuclear waste:

What is the total national commercial nuclear waste inventory in the US

As of February 2024, the United States has accumulated approximately 92,500 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from commercial nuclear power plants. This inventory continues to grow by about 2,000 metric tons each year, as spent fuel is stored on-site at nuclear power plant locations across the country.

The spent fuel is stored either in spent fuel pools (wet storage) or in dry cask storage systems at these reactor sites. The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for developing a permanent disposal solution for this high-level radioactive waste. However, as of now, a permanent geologic repository has not been established, and the spent fuel continues to be stored at reactor sites.

https://www.wsj.com/us-news/climate-environment/nuclear-power-plant-waste-ai-data-center-657c067f?utm_source=chatgpt.com

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/nuclear-renaissance-must-still-solve-spent-fuel-ross-kerber-2024-10-16/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

<https://apnews.com/article/supreme-court-nuclear-waste-texas-new-mexico-a426602c562f3a43696f0a2a9760ffde>

How many tons of nuclear waste in a year does the PINGP generate?

Estimate of Waste Generation:

- A typical nuclear reactor in the U.S. generates approximately 20 to 30 tons of spent nuclear fuel per year.
- Prairie Island operates two reactors. If each reactor produces about 20 to 30 tons of spent fuel per year, then combined, the two reactors would generate roughly 40 to 60 tons of spent fuel annually.
- An additional 30 years of operations at Prairie Island (until 2054) would generate an additional @1200 tons of nuclear waste.

1. What are the half lives of radiological elements in nuclear waste

The half-lives of the radioactive elements found in high-level nuclear waste can vary widely, depending on the specific isotopes present. High-level nuclear waste is primarily composed of the spent fuel from nuclear reactors, which contains a variety of radioactive isotopes. Here are the half-lives of some key radioactive isotopes found in high-level nuclear waste:

1. Cesium-137 (Cs-137)

- Half-life: 30.1 years
- Decay: Emits beta particles and gamma radiation, contributing to the radiation hazard of nuclear waste.

2. Strontium-90 (Sr-90)

- Half-life: 28.8 years
- Decay: Emits beta particles, and it is a significant concern for both radiation exposure and environmental contamination.

3. Iodine-131 (I-131)

- Half-life: 8.02 days
- Decay: Emits beta particles and gamma radiation. Iodine-131 is highly radioactive but decays quickly compared to other isotopes.

4. Plutonium-239 (Pu-239)

- Half-life: 24,100 years
- Decay: Alpha emitter, highly toxic if inhaled or ingested, and it remains hazardous for thousands of years.

5. Neptunium-239 (Np-239)

- Half-life: 2.356 days (decays into Plutonium-239)
- Decay: A precursor to Plutonium-239, but with a very short half-life compared to Pu-239.

6. Uranium-235 (U-235)

- Half-life: 703.8 million years
- Decay: Uranium-235 undergoes fission in nuclear reactors but is present in spent fuel as an isotope that has not completely fissioned.

7. Uranium-238 (U-238)

- Half-life: 4.468 billion years
- Decay: Uranium-238 is another component of spent fuel. Although not highly radioactive itself, it eventually decays into radon and other elements.

8. Americium-241 (Am-241)

- Half-life: 432.2 years
- Decay: An alpha emitter formed from the decay of Plutonium-241 (another product of fission), highly radioactive.

9. Curium-244 (Cm-244)

- Half-life: 18.1 years
- Decay: Alpha emitter, a product of plutonium and americium decay.

10. Ruthenium-106 (Ru-106)

- Half-life: 373.59 days
- Decay: A product of nuclear fission, emits beta particles and gamma radiation.

11. Technetium-99 (Tc-99)

- Half-life: 211,000 years
- Decay: Beta emitter, a significant environmental concern due to its long half-life.

These isotopes are dangerous due to their radioactivity, and their long half-lives mean that nuclear waste remains hazardous for many years, often requiring safe storage solutions for thousands of years. Some of these isotopes (like Cesium-137, Strontium-90, and Iodine-131) decay relatively quickly (on the order of decades), while others (like Plutonium-239 and Uranium-238) remain hazardous for millennia.

2. What is the radiological composition of a fuel assembly pellet

A nuclear fuel pellet is typically composed of uranium oxide (UO_2), which is the primary material used in most nuclear reactors. Here's a breakdown of the composition and structure of a typical nuclear fuel pellet:

1. Uranium Oxide (UO_2):

- Uranium-235 (U-235): This is the fissile isotope, meaning it undergoes fission when it absorbs a neutron. U-235 makes up a small fraction of natural uranium (about 0.7%).
- Uranium-238 (U-238): This isotope makes up the majority of the uranium in the pellet (about 99.3%). U-238 is fertile, meaning it can be converted into plutonium-239 (Pu-239) through neutron absorption, which can also undergo fission.

2. Densified Fuel:

- The uranium oxide is typically compressed into very dense ceramic pellets. These pellets are about the size of a pencil eraser, but they are much more dense to allow for higher fuel efficiency.

3. Pellet Form:

- The pellets are cylindrical in shape and are stacked together in long metal tubes called fuel rods. These fuel rods are then bundled together to form a fuel assembly.

4. Cladding:

- The fuel pellets are encased in zirconium alloy cladding, commonly made from Zircaloy (an alloy of zirconium and tin). This cladding serves to contain the uranium oxide, prevent radioactive release, and resist corrosion in the reactor's harsh environment.

5. Additives:

- Sometimes, small amounts of other elements, like neodymium or yttrium, may be added to improve the pellet's structural integrity or to manage thermal properties.

Overall, uranium oxide is the main component, with its uranium isotopes and ceramic form optimized for sustained energy production in nuclear reactors. The cladding is vital for the safety and containment of the fuel.

3. How much radioactive material is left in a pellet when it is removed from the reactor and becomes nuclear waste?

When a nuclear fuel pellet is removed from the reactor and becomes spent nuclear fuel (or nuclear waste), it still contains a significant amount of radioactive material, though not in the same proportions as when it was first placed in the reactor. Here's a breakdown of what remains:

1. Uranium (U-235 and U-238)

- Uranium-235 (U-235):
 - Initially, U-235 makes up about 3-5% of the uranium in the fuel at the start of the reactor cycle (for most reactors that use enriched uranium). After the fuel has been irradiated, a significant portion of the U-235 is consumed in fission reactions.

- After the fuel is removed, U-235 is mostly depleted, but some residual U-235 remains in the spent fuel, typically around 0.5% to 1% of the original amount.
- Uranium-238 (U-238):
 - U-238 does not undergo fission in most reactors but absorbs neutrons and is converted into plutonium-239 (Pu-239) over time.
 - After the fuel is removed, U-238 remains in the spent fuel, but a significant portion of it may have been converted to plutonium and other actinides.

2. Plutonium (Pu-239 and others)

- Plutonium-239 (Pu-239):
 - As U-238 absorbs neutrons, it undergoes a series of nuclear reactions and is converted into plutonium isotopes, primarily Pu-239, which is fissile and can also undergo fission.
 - By the time the fuel is removed, up to 1-2% of the fuel's mass may consist of plutonium, which can be used in nuclear reactors or in nuclear weapons.
- Other Plutonium Isotopes: Other plutonium isotopes, such as Pu-240, Pu-241, and Pu-242, are also present, though in smaller quantities. Some of these isotopes are also fissile and contribute to the overall radioactivity of the spent fuel.

3. Fission Products

- A large portion of the radioactive material in spent fuel consists of fission products, which are the byproducts of the fission reactions that occur when U-235 and other isotopes undergo splitting. These fission products are typically very radioactive and have a wide range of half-lives.
- The amount of fission products can constitute up to 90% of the radioactive material in the spent fuel, but they decay quickly compared to the actinides (like uranium and plutonium).
- Fission products include elements like iodine-131, cesium-137, strontium-90, and xenon-133, among others.

4. Other Actinides

- In addition to uranium and plutonium, spent nuclear fuel also contains other actinides such as neptunium, americium, and curium, which are produced through neutron capture during the reactor's operation.

Summary:

- After a nuclear pellet is removed from the reactor, the remaining radioactive material consists mostly of fission products (about 90% of the radioactivity), and a smaller portion of plutonium, residual uranium, and other actinides.
- The radioactive decay of fission products is quite rapid in the initial years, but the actinides (like plutonium) remain highly radioactive for much longer periods (thousands of years).

Thus, while much of the U-235 is consumed, a considerable amount of plutonium and other radioactive isotopes remain, making spent nuclear fuel highly radioactive and necessitating careful storage and management

4. How much plutonium and uranium are still present in a typical spent fuel rod

The composition of a typical spent nuclear fuel rod changes significantly over time, but both plutonium and uranium remain present in the rod even after it has been used in a reactor. The exact amount of each depends on factors such as the reactor type, the length of time the fuel has been used, and the burnup rate (how much energy the fuel has produced before being removed from the reactor).

1. Uranium in Spent Fuel

Spent nuclear fuel rods still contain a large amount of uranium, primarily in the form of U-238, which is the most common isotope of uranium. Some of the uranium will have been converted into plutonium (specifically Pu-239) in the reactor due to neutron absorption.

- Uranium content: After a typical reactor cycle, about 95% of the original uranium in the fuel rod remains as U-238.
- Uranium isotope breakdown: The remaining uranium is typically a mix of U-235 (which is the fissile material used to sustain the fission chain reaction) and U-238. After the fuel is spent, the proportion of U-235 drops significantly, while most of the uranium is still U-238, which is non-fissile under normal conditions but can be used in future reactors or reprocessing.

2. Plutonium in Spent Fuel

Plutonium is created in the reactor when uranium-238 absorbs neutrons and undergoes a series of nuclear reactions. This plutonium is a mix of several isotopes, including:

- Pu-239: This is the most significant isotope for nuclear fuel purposes since it is fissile, meaning it can sustain a nuclear chain reaction.

- Pu-240, Pu-241, and Pu-242: These isotopes are also present, but they are less useful for energy production due to their higher rates of neutron absorption, which can lead to wasteful reactions.
- Plutonium content: In spent fuel, the total amount of plutonium is typically around 1-2% of the total mass of the spent fuel. This can vary depending on the burnup and reactor type.

3. Other Fission Products

In addition to uranium and plutonium, a large amount of fission products (stable and radioactive isotopes created by the fission process) are produced during reactor operation. These fission products make up about 4-5% of the spent fuel, and they contribute significantly to the radiation and heat emitted by the spent fuel.

Breakdown Example for Spent Fuel (after about 3 years of use in a light water reactor):

- Uranium (U-238): ~95% of the initial mass of the uranium in the fuel remains as U-238.
- Plutonium: ~1-2% of the fuel mass, primarily in the form of Pu-239, with smaller amounts of other plutonium isotopes (Pu-240, Pu-241, Pu-242).
- Fission Products: Around 4-5% of the total mass.

Summary of Key Points:

- After a typical reactor cycle, the spent fuel rod still contains mostly U-238 (about 95%), with small amounts of U-235 left.
- The half-life of Uranium-238 (U-238) is approximately 4.468 billion years. U-238 decays by emitting an alpha particle. Alpha particles are highly ionizing, meaning they can cause significant damage to cells, but they have very low penetration power and can be stopped by something as thin as a sheet of paper or even human skin. However, alpha particles are extremely dangerous if inhaled, ingested, or if they enter the body through a wound. Inside the body, they can cause substantial damage to internal tissues and organs because they deposit a lot of energy in a small area. Common sources of alpha radiation include radon gas and certain isotopes like Uranium-238 and Radium-226.
- Plutonium will be present in the spent fuel at about 1-2% of the mass, primarily as Pu-239, with other plutonium isotopes.

- The remaining mass is mostly composed of fission products that result from the fission of uranium and plutonium.

5. Please provide cost estimates for periodic replacement of at reactor site facilities:

Cost Estimates for facility replacement (Chatgpt)

While a precise figure for replacing nuclear waste storage facilities every 100 years is difficult to pin down, there are some rough numbers based on current estimates for nuclear waste management. For example:

- Current storage costs: Building a modern dry cask storage facility (a common method for interim storage) can cost anywhere from \$10 million to \$30 million per site depending on the size and safety measures.

Long-Term Costs

Given that the storage infrastructure would likely need to be updated or replaced every 100 years, the cost of maintaining, replacing, or upgrading these facilities would compound over time. If we were to project costs over, say, 1,000 years (assuming 10 replacements over that period), this could lead to total expenditures well into the hundreds of billions of dollars, though exact numbers are speculative.

A detailed, long-term financial plan for nuclear waste disposal and storage would require careful analysis, including factoring in inflation, technological advances, and the potential for different methods of waste management in the future.

Ultimately, the cost of replacing storage facilities is a major consideration in the ongoing debate about the long-term management of nuclear waste, and policymakers continue to grapple with these financial implications.

Replacing the dry casks used for storing nuclear waste also presents significant costs. These casks are typically used for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel, and they are generally expected to last for decades. However, as with any infrastructure, they will eventually require replacement due to factors like material degradation, changes in safety standards, and technological advancements.

Estimating the Cost of Replacing Dry Casks (Chatgpt)

Dry casks are used to store spent nuclear fuel in a secure and controlled environment. The cost to replace these casks would depend on factors like:

1. Size and number of casks: The number of casks required depends on how much spent fuel is stored at a facility. Each cask can cost anywhere from \$1 million to \$3 million, depending on its size and design.
2. Regulatory requirements: As regulations evolve, casks may need to be updated to meet newer safety and environmental standards. Compliance with new standards could raise the cost of replacement.
3. Transportation and installation: Replacing casks involves not just the cost of purchasing new casks, but also the costs associated with transportation, installation, and potential site modifications.
4. Service life of casks: Dry casks are generally designed for 40-60 years of use, but this may be extended with modifications or proper maintenance. If replacements are needed every 100 years, that adds additional cost considerations.
5. Technology improvements: Over time, better materials or more efficient designs may reduce the cost of building and replacing casks, but that remains uncertain.

General Cost Ranges

While a detailed cost analysis would depend on specific factors at each facility, here are some general ranges:

- Cost per dry cask: As mentioned, a new dry cask can cost between \$1 million and \$3 million. For large storage sites, hundreds of casks might be used.
- Long-term replacement costs: If the dry casks need to be replaced every 50-100 years (assuming a lifespan of 40-60 years per cask), the cost for replacing casks at a large facility could run into hundreds of millions of dollars over time. For example, a facility with 100 dry casks would potentially face a cost of \$100 million to \$300 million just to replace the casks, not including installation or regulatory costs.
- Annual storage costs: A rough estimate suggests that the cost of storage, including both construction of cask systems and ongoing operation, can range from \$5 million to \$30 million per year, depending on the scale of the facility and the number of casks in use.

Total Long-Term Cost Considerations

If you consider the replacement cycle over time (e.g., replacing casks every 60 years or so), a site with hundreds of casks would face major expenses every few decades. A long-term financial strategy for replacing casks would be needed to account for inflation, regulatory changes, and the growth of nuclear waste volumes.

Conclusion

In summary, while replacing dry casks is not as expensive as building entire nuclear waste storage facilities, it still represents a significant ongoing cost. The long-term financial implications of replacing casks at regular intervals could potentially run into the hundreds of millions of dollars for large facilities, adding to the overall expense of nuclear waste management. This ongoing maintenance cost is a key factor that must be considered in planning for nuclear waste disposal over many decades

["IT'S JUST A STEAM PLANT"] It took me many years to realize that the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant was “just a steam plant”, with the water to drive the turbines heated by nuclear fission.]

What is the role of the nuclear element in a Pressurized water reactor -

In a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), the role of the nuclear fuel (typically uranium fuel pellets) is central to the process of generating heat through nuclear fission. Here's a detailed explanation of the role of nuclear fuel in a PWR:

1. Fission Process:

- **Uranium Fuel:** In most PWRs, the nuclear fuel is composed of enriched uranium (U-235), typically in the form of uranium oxide (UO₂) pellets. These pellets are stacked inside fuel rods, and the rods are bundled together to form fuel assemblies.
- **Fission Reaction:** When the reactor is operating, uranium-235 (U-235) nuclei inside the fuel pellets absorb neutrons. This absorption causes the U-235 nuclei to become unstable and undergo fission (splitting). Each fission event releases a large amount of energy in the form of heat and also produces additional neutrons.

2. Heat Generation:

- **Energy Release:** Each time a U-235 atom undergoes fission, it releases about 200 million electron volts (MeV) of energy in the form of heat. This heat is absorbed by the surrounding material in the fuel rods.
- **Chain Reaction:** The fission process releases neutrons, which can go on to induce further fission reactions in other U-235 atoms, sustaining a chain reaction. This process is carefully controlled in a PWR by adjusting the number of neutrons through control rods and moderators.

3. Moderation of Neutrons:

- In a PWR, the neutron moderator is water (specifically, high-pressure light water, H_2O), which slows down the fast-moving neutrons produced by fission. Slower neutrons are more likely to cause additional fission reactions when they collide with other U-235 atoms.
- The water in the reactor serves both as the coolant and as the moderator, slowing down neutrons to sustain the chain reaction.

4. Heat Transfer to the Primary Loop:

- **Primary Circuit:** The heat generated by the fission process in the uranium fuel pellets heats up the water circulating through the reactor core (the primary loop). This water is kept under high pressure to prevent it from boiling, which allows it to reach temperatures of about 320°C (608°F) without turning into steam.
- This hot, pressurized water is pumped through the reactor core to carry away the heat produced by the fission reactions.

5. Energy Transfer to Secondary Loop (Steam Generation):

- The heated water in the primary loop is transferred through a heat exchanger (called a steam generator) to the secondary loop.
- In the steam generator, the heat from the primary loop is used to turn water in the secondary loop into steam.
- The steam generated in the secondary loop is then used to drive a turbine connected to a generator, which produces electricity.

6. Control of the Reaction:

- The fission process is controlled using control rods, which are made of materials that absorb neutrons (such as boron or cadmium). By inserting or withdrawing these control rods from the reactor core, operators can control the rate of fission and, therefore, the heat output.
- **Fuel Burnup:** Over time, as U-235 atoms undergo fission, they are depleted, and the fuel becomes less efficient. The reactor is designed to operate for several years before the fuel needs to be replaced or reprocessed.

Summary of the Role of Nuclear Fuel in a PWR:

- Nuclear fuel (U-235) in the form of uranium oxide pellets undergoes fission reactions, releasing a large amount of heat.

- The heat is transferred to the primary coolant loop, where it heats water to high temperatures under pressure.
- This hot water is then used to produce steam in a steam generator, which drives a turbine to generate electricity.
- The chain reaction is carefully controlled using control rods to maintain a steady, safe rate of fission.

In essence, the nuclear fuel in a Pressurized Water Reactor acts as the source of heat that drives the power generation process, while the reactor's design ensures that this heat is efficiently and safely converted into electricity.

Yes, in a sense, a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) can be thought of as a type of steam generator, but with a much more complex role due to the nuclear fission process that powers it. Here's a bit more detail:

Key Roles of a PWR:

1. **Nuclear Heat Source:** The primary purpose of a PWR is to generate heat through nuclear fission, not directly to generate steam. Inside the reactor core, uranium fuel undergoes fission, releasing a tremendous amount of heat.
2. **Steam Generation:** The heat produced in the core is transferred to the primary loop (high-pressure water), which carries the heat to a steam generator. The steam generator, in turn, uses that heat to convert water in a secondary loop into steam. This steam is what actually drives the turbine to generate electricity.

So, to clarify:

- Nuclear Reactor Core (PWR) = Heat Source (via fission)
- Steam Generator = Converts heat into steam to drive the turbine and generate electricity

While a PWR does use the heat generated by the nuclear reactions to create steam indirectly, it's not just a steam generator—it's a nuclear reactor that produces the heat for the steam generator. Without the nuclear reactions taking place in the reactor core, there would be no heat to make steam.

In summary, the PWR can be thought of as a complex steam generator system, but it's much more than that—it's the heart of a nuclear power plant, where nuclear energy is converted into thermal energy, which is then used to generate steam and ultimately produce electricity.

